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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper seeks to link location choice and ownership structure to the debate on the 
multinationality-performance relationship. 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper draws on a panel dataset that covers 1,321 
emerging economy multinational enterprises (EMNEs) and includes 4,227 observations from 
44 emerging economies between 2004 and 2013. 
Findings – In our empirical results, we find that multinationality has a positive effect on 
EMNEs’ performance, and that this positive effect is larger for their investments in developed 
countries than in developing countries. We also find that this positive effect of foreign operation 
in developed countries switch to negative at higher levels of multinationality for privately-
owned EMNEs than for state-owned EMNEs. 
Originality/value – This paper provides new empirical evidence to support an institutional 
perspective of the internationalisation of EMNEs that are investing in developed countries, 
contributing to the multinationality-performance literature, highlighting the importance of FDI 
location decision and ownership structure. 
Keywords Emerging economies, Multinationality, Location choice, Ownership structure, Firm 
performance 
Paper Type Research paper 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between multinationality and firm performance has remained an important 
research issue for business scholars over the past three decades (Contractor et al., 2003; 
Majocchi and Strange, 2012; Yang and Driffield, 2012; Castellani et al., 2017). Multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) expand operations across foreign countries. Internationalisation results in 
costs such as unfamiliarity with foreign markets, sunk costs at early internationalisation and 
great coordination costs. International expansion also benefits firm performance by helping 
MNEs access cheaper resources, acquire foreign knowledge, realise economies of scale, and 
exploit firm-specific assets in foreign markets. Overall, the observed multinationality-
performance (MP) relationship is the net effect of these costs and benefits (Contractor, 2007). 
 This paper seeks to link location choice and ownership structure to the debate on the 
MP relationship in the emerging economy context. The large MP literature mostly relies on the 
data from developed countries MNEs, and insufficient attention has been given to the emerging 
economy multinational enterprises’ (EMNEs) international activity, while EMNE’s foreign 
direct investment (FDI) motivation and investment patterns are very different from developed 
MNEs (DMNEs) (Ramamurti, 2012). Moreover, the extant literature tends to focus on whether 
the MP relationship is linear; it proposes various functional forms by adding second-order or 
higher-order terms. The studies on developed MNEs find inconsistent empirical results, 
including insignificant, positive, negative, U-shaped, inverted U-shaped, S-shaped or even M-
shaped relationships. However, they generally ignore how important moderators, such as 
location choice and ownership structure, shape the MP relationship. Drawing on a dataset of 
1,321 emerging economy firms, this paper aims to fill these gaps by providing a better 
understanding of EMNEs’ foreign operations and their performance implications. 
FDI location is one important aspect of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 2000). 
The location decisions might be influenced by a number of country characteristics that include, 
but are not limited to, low-cost labour force, cheap natural resources, market size and income 
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level (Dunning, 1988). However, the large literature generally disregards the heterogeneity 
among different FDI locations and instead chooses an aggregate view of foreign investments. 
With a few exceptions (Pantzalis, 2001; Berry, 2006), they did not consider the curvilinear MP 
relationship when considering location choices. Crucially our data have the information 
regarding the FDI location. We intend to look into whether the returns to multinationality for 
EMNEs investing in developed countries are different from those investing in developing 
countries. 
We explore the importance of ownership structure in internationalisation and firm 
performance. Ownership structure affects FDI motivation and interacts with the home and host 
environments (Li and Oh, 2016); this will then have an impact on firm’s multinational 
performance (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). The extant MP literature gives limited attention to 
ownership structure, particularly from an institutional perspective. The multinational network 
determines that the MNE could be influenced by home and host institutional environments (Xu 
and Shenkar, 2002). We aim to examine how the multinational performance of MNEs is 
affected by the interaction between institutional ownerships (private vs. state ownership) and 
institutional environments in the home and host countries. We compare the performance 
differences between privately-owned enterprises (POEs) and state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) 
when investing in developed countries. 
It is argued that international business scholars should increase the use of longitudinal 
data to better understand the relative change of an MNE’s internationalisation over time 
(Hennart, 2007). To test our hypothesis, we draw on panel data containing 1,321 MNEs from 
44 emerging economies over a period from 2004 to 2013. 
As in prior related research, we find an inverted U-shaped MP relationship for EMNEs, 
which seems to be similar to that of DMNEs in some studies (Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003; Qian 
et al., 2008); however, additional factors matter in EMNEs. First, although a significant positive 
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effect of multinationality on performance at the initial stage is proved, we find that this positive 
effect is larger when investing in developed than in developing countries. In addition, we find 
that the positive effect of investing in a developed country at the initial stage is stronger for 
POEs than for SOEs. These results indicate that EMNEs’ performance benefits a great deal 
from the enhanced firm-specific advantage (FSA) derived from assets-augmenting FDI in 
developed countries. This seems to explain why EMNEs tend to invest more in developed 
countries than in other developing countries (Ramamurti, 2012). Also, these results seem to 
explain private EMNEs’ institutional escapism (Li and Oh, 2016), and why POEs perform 
better than SOEs in international operations when facing home institutional push and host 
institutional pull. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. After the introduction section, we provide a 
review of the relevant literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 explains the 
methodology. Section 4 discusses the regression results. The final section concludes. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Internationalisation provides firms with many benefits (Castellani and Zanfei, 2006). Going 
abroad can help firms gain access to resources such as cheap labour force (Contractor, 2007). 
Expanding sales by either exporting or investing abroad allows firms to benefit from economies 
of scale (Krugman, 1980). MNEs may enjoy reduced costs per unit of output because fixed 
costs can be spread over a large scale of production. MNEs could exploit their firm-specific 
assets in the foreign countries and earn abnormal profits, through an internalised multinational 
network (Castellani and Zanfei, 2007; Buckley and Strange, 2011). When investing abroad, a 
firm can obtain experience and foreign knowledge, which could help MNEs perceive and seize 
other foreign markets’ opportunity, contributing to their superior performance (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977).  
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While a number of factors lead to the prediction of a positive effect of multinationality 
on firm performance, several factors may impose negative impact on profitability. The most 
important ones are a lack of international experience and growing coordination costs (Qian, 
2002). The coordination and governance costs rise with the increased foreign operation (Lu and 
Beamish, 2004). When operating in multiple countries, the differing institutions and culture add 
to the complexity of coordination issues (Sundaram and Black, 1992). Hennart (2007) adopts a 
transaction cost/internalisation (TCI) model to critique the theoretical background of MP 
literature, particularly focusing on economies of scale, operational flexibility and learning 
experience. He argues that there is no direct MP relationship. However, Contractor (2007) 
contends that Hennart’s assumptions about MNEs are too stringent and a TCI lens provides too 
limited a view, indicating alternative perspectives from strategy and international business 
literature. Contractor concludes that internationalisation is good for companies.  
There is a considerable literature on the MP relationship, but much of it uses data on 
DMNEs. The empirical results are rather mixed. Some empirical evidence supports that 
international diversification can enhance firm performance (Kim et al., 1993; Goerzen and 
Beamish, 2003). However, some papers find a negative relationship (Siddharthan and Lall, 
1982; Denis et al., 2002). Recently, scholars have focused more on a non-linear relationship. 
Some empirical works find a U-shaped relationship (Lu and Beamish, 2001; Thomas and Eden, 
2004), while others discover an inverted U-shaped relationship (Hitt et al., 1997; Qian et al., 
2008). Alternatively, some scholars propose S-shaped (Contractor et al., 2003), inverted S-
shaped (Ruigrok et al., 2007) or M-shaped MP relationships (Lee, 2010). For a comprehensive 
summary of the findings of these extant studies, see the recent meta-analysis of Yang and 
Driffield (2012). 
It can be seen that previous empirical literature provides decidedly mixed evidence of 
the MP relationship, which may be partly due to the ignorance of important variables such as 
6 
 
location and ownership structure which we will consider in this paper. In addition, these 
findings are mainly based on the analysis of DMNEs (e.g. US firms). A few exceptions 
(Contractor et al., 2007; Gaur and Kumar, 2009) only focus on one emerging country. We need 
to further discuss whether these findings can be applied to MNEs from various emerging 
economies. EMNEs are different from DMNEs with respect to the content of their FSA. The 
emerging giants from several countries, including Huawei (China) and Infosys (India), have 
attracted attention from both scholars and managers (Khanna and Palepu, 2006). It is fascinating 
and interesting for academics to understand why and how EMNEs go international and 
subsequently perform.  
Multinationality-Performance Relationship and Emerging Economy Multinationals  
Drawing on Rugman’s CSA/FSA framework, this paper aims to provide a better understanding 
of the MP relationship for EMNEs. This framework is widely adopted in the international 
business field to analyse the competitive advantages of an MNE. Linking to internalisation 
theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976) and the resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984), the 
CSA/FSA framework (Rugman and Verbeke, 2003) emphasises that the interaction and 
combination of CSAs (e.g., labour force, natural resources) and FSAs (strength, capabilities, 
unique resources) determine an MNE’s internationalisation activities and its performance 
implications. Prior studies have positioned the majority of EMNEs in quadrant 1 (weak FSAs 
and strong CSAs) in the CSA/FSA matrix (Li and Oh, 2016).  
One may incorrectly conclude that EMNEs do not possess FSAs which are similar to 
those owned by western MNEs. However, EMNEs do own FSAs and we need to consider a 
broader definition of FSA that a firm can have. Scholars took comparable efforts to identify the 
non-traditional and unique FSA of EMNEs (Ramamurti, 2009). Based on Rugman and Verbeke 
(2003)’s CSA/FSA matrix, firms internationalise by leveraging firm-specific advantages (FSAs) 
and country-specific advantages (CSAs). EMNEs tend to drive performance by leveraging 
country-specific advantages rather than traditional firm-specific advantages.  
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Economies of scale are an important country-specific advantage for EMNEs, as they 
typically enjoy a large and growing domestic demand base. In addition, EMNEs may have an 
advantage in the access to some resources (e.g., cheap gas, oil and a cheap semi-skilled labour 
force). This competitive advantage tends to be location-bound and country-specific (Bhaumik 
et al., 2016).  
EMNEs have non-traditional FSAs in the strategic flexibility in coordinating the use of 
existing resources and producing low-cost goods (Wright et al., 2005). They have strong 
capability in adapting the available technology to resource-scarce and labour-intensive 
production (Bhaumik et al., 2016). For instance, the competitive advantage of India’s IT service 
industry partly relies on the adaptation of existing communication technology and the abundant 
supply of educated English-speaking Indian workers who graduate from various engineering 
education institutes in India (Pack and Saggi, 2006). Also, EMNEs have non-traditional FSAs 
that it is argued helps facilitate leveraging CSA across national borders. Internationalisation 
allows EMNEs to leverage country-specific advantages (e.g., economies of scale) across 
various foreign countries, augmenting their FSAs by leveraging location advantage of host 
countries, enhancing EMNEs competitiveness and performance in the home country (Bhaumik 
et al., 2016). 
Apart from the developing non-traditional FSAs, recently they are also developing the 
strong FSAs similar to those owned by traditional western MNEs. In emerging economies, a 
modern set of knowledge-intensive high-tech sectors that are capital-intensive and skill-
dependent have grown in parallel with traditional sectors that depend on labour-intensive and 
natural resource-intensive activities (Narula, 2015). Unlike the DMNEs that use existing 
resources to expand abroad, EMNEs expand abroad while creating resources (e.g, acquisition 
of foreign technology) (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). EMNEs can quickly enlarge firm-specific 
advantage through acquisitions of foreign strategic assets (e.g., strong brand, technology), if 
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they invest a great deal in their own R&D activity and have high absorptive capacity (Narula, 
2015). 
Indeed, in recent years, EMNEs have become increasingly able to rely on stronger 
ownership-specific assets (e.g., latest technology) as a result of the co-evolution of their 
ownership-specific advantages and their home countries’ national innovation systems (NIS) 
(Elia and Santangelo, 2017). The development of country-specific advantages (e.g., knowledge 
and institutional infrastructure such as universities and R&D clusters conducting research in 
cutting-edge technologies) in the emerging economies has fed the absorptive capabilities of 
EMNEs. For instance, China has been ranked number one in the world for host location of 
greenfield FDI in R&D projects since 2010 (Laursen and Santangelo, 2017). The emerging 
economies have experienced an upgrade of their technological capabilities and the large 
availability of talents (Laursen and Santangelo, 2017). This enables them to better understand 
and absorb the knowledge acquired in the strategic assets augmenting acquisition in developed 
countries with a strong NIS context (Elia and Santangelo, 2017). This has also fostered the 
country-specific advantage, and thus the domestic firms’ firm-specific advantage (Laursen and 
Santangelo, 2017). 
Given the fast evolution of EMNEs, the international business literature suggests that 
EMNEs are more and more similar to advanced MNEs in terms of strategic behaviour and 
performance implications. As the EMNEs become more internationalised or more experienced 
by operating in a large number of countries, their multinationality does not differ greatly from 
that of DMNEs, leading to a higher similarity between EMNEs and DMNEs (especially in terms 
of CSAs and FSAs) (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). 
We draw on Haans et al. (2016) to have a deeper understanding of how the interplay of 
costs and benefits shape the effect of multinationality on firm performance. We do this by 
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considering the two latent mechanisms (benefits of multinationality; costs of multinationality) 
that determine the relationship (net effects of multinationality on firm performance)  
On the one hand, the positive effects are derived from foreign operations. EMNEs have 
their unique firm-specific advantage derived from country-specific advantage; these include 
scale economies, natural resources, cheap semi-skilled labour, government support in financing 
and overseas investment (Bhaumik et al., 2016; Li and Oh, 2016). Their FSAs includes 
producing products at ultra-low costs, coordinating the use of existing resource, adaptation 
skills of the available technology, and ability to utilise and upgrade capabilities (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Ramamurti, 2012). In addition, due to the enhanced absorptive 
capabilities fed by improved domestic knowledge and institutional infrastructure, they are able 
to absorb acquired foreign knowledge and develop traditional FSAs (e.g., advanced technology, 
global brand and good management team) (Laursen and Santangelo, 2017). They are becoming 
increasingly able to rely on stronger ownership-specific assets (e.g., latest technology) as a 
result of the co-evolution of their ownership-specific advantage and the home country’s 
national innovation system (NIS) (Elia and Santangelo, 2017). The positive effect is expected 
to grow at a declining rate, due to the diminishing benefit of FSA when it is overstretched in 
geographically diverse operations (Tallman and Li, 1996; Hitt et al., 1997).  
On the other hand, the negative effects are arising from foreign investment. International 
operations create managerial complexity due to dissimilar environments such as trade barriers 
and cultural difference. Coordination problems occur when the firm is operating in unfamiliar 
foreign environments (Hitt et al., 1997). Managerial complexity increases with multinationality 
(Grant, 1987), as more intensive foreign operations impose higher requirements on 
communication and coordination not only between headquarters and overseas subsidiaries, but 
also among overseas subsidiaries in different countries (Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003). Also, the 
environmental difference, which increases with the foreign expansion, enhances the risk of 
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misallocation of resources in firm’s various markets (Hitt et al., 1994). This negative effect of 
an international presence would grow at an increasing rate.  
Taking these two counteracting forces of foreign operations on firm performance 
together, we subtract the convex increasing function from the concave increasing function. The 
net effect is an inverted U-shaped relationship between multinationality and firm performance. 
At low levels of multinationality, the positive effect of firm-specific advantage dominates, 
leading to a positive impact of multinationality on firm performance. In contrast, at high levels 
of multinationality, the negative effect of accelerating global coordination costs prevails, thus 
driving a negative impact of diversification on firm performance. Based on the above argument, 
we propose the following hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 1: Multinationality has an inverted U-shaped relationship with firm 
performance for emerging economy multinationals: (a) there is a positive linear effect 
and (b) a negative quadratic effect of multinationality on performance. 
Considering the possibility that the relative strength of two countervailing effects may 
vary several times throughout the internationalisation process, which leads to higher function 
forms such as S-shaped (Contractor, 2007) and inverted S-shaped (Ruigrok et al., 2007) MP 
relationships, we will test these cubic relationships as a robustness check. 
 
Location Choice 
Although we expect the same kind of MP relationship (i.e. inverted U-shaped) for EMNEs 
relative to DMNEs, additional factors will be relevant in EMNEs, including location choice and 
ownership structure. To draw a conclusion regarding the MP relationship, most studies discuss 
internationalisation costs and benefits, and regress the performance measure on different 
proxies of the multinationality measure. However, the literature generally uses an aggregate 
measure to examine the multinationality, ignoring the heterogeneity of FDI locations 
(Beugelsdijk et al., 2010). Yang et al. (2013) find that the returns from foreign direct investment 
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are determined by the economic distance between the home and host country. A few papers 
(Pantzalis, 2001; Berry, 2006) examining the role of location on the MP relationship consider 
the differences between developed and developing countries. Doukas and Travlos (1988)’s 
results indicate that if a US MNE acquires a firm in an unfamiliar country, this cross-border 
acquisition can improve the value of the MNE, suggesting that good location choice enhances 
firm performance. However, they did not find curvilinear MP relationship when considering 
location choice.  
Much research has been done with respect to the FDI flows from developed country to 
developing countries, an FDI pattern predicted in the product cycle hypothesis (Vernon, 1966; 
Ramamurti, 2012). However, the opposite FDI pattern, namely from developing countries to 
developed country, has not received enough attention. Further, this opposite FDI pattern could 
not be explained by an incremental internationalisation process model (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977). EMNEs from some emerging economies tend to invest more in developed countries 
(dissimilar to home) than in other developing countries (similar to home) (Ramamurti, 2012). 
Therefore, we need a more promising explanation of EMNEs’ FDI location choice. Also, 
particular attention should be given to the EMNEs’ FDI motivations in developed countries. 
It is important to distinguish between asset-exploiting FDI and asset-augmenting FDI. 
Asset-augmenting FDI has become increasingly important in recent years, particularly among 
emerging economy MNEs. On the one hand, asset-exploiting FDI prevails among the 
investments in developing countries. MNEs exploit their firm-specific assets in the developing 
countries and establish competitiveness in these countries (Dunning, 2000). On the other hand, 
asset-augmenting FDI dominates among the investments in developed countries. EMNEs 
acquire foreign strategic assets in the developed countries with the aim of strengthening their 
capabilities (e.g., technology, marketing and managerial capabilities), leading to enhanced 
competitiveness and market position in the home countries or other countries (Meyer, 2015). 
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This explains why EMNEs often adopt a high commitment mode such as acquisition to enter a 
new market, instead of low commitment and low-risk choice such as establishing sales 
subsidiaries (Madhok and Keyhani, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012).  
The extent of knowledge emerging country firms learn through international expansion 
in developed countries is positive and pronounced. A meta-analysis by Yang and Driffield 
(2012) finds that developing country firms are, on average, away from the technology frontier, 
and could learn customer or segment information in overseas markets, leading to a great 
improvement in technological capability and knowledge know-how. This finding is in line with 
reverse knowledge transfer literature that states that countries with high technological 
capabilities can transfer knowledge back to their headquarters, leading to productivity 
improvements (Driffield et al., 2016). 
Again, we employ the approach of Haans et al. (2016), with particular consideration 
given to the two counteracting latent mechanisms (benefits of FDI to developed countries; costs 
of FDI to developed countries) that determine the relationship (net effect of foreign presence in 
developed countries on firm performance). 
On the one hand, the firm’s enhanced FSAs resulting from asset-augmenting FDI in 
developed countries (Makino et al., 2002) reinforces the positive effect of foreign operations 
on firm performance. Through acquiring firms in developed countries to augment strategic 
assets (e.g., foreign technology, brand and managerial skills), EMNEs have the opportunity to 
develop their own intangible assets (e.g., technological capability, marketing skills) under the 
strong protection of intellectual property in developed countries. This is nearly impossible in 
the home country context where the poor intellectual property enforcement discourages firms 
from investing in R&D and creating new products (Gaur and Kumar, 2009). If an EMNE holds 
a geographically-diversified portfolio with strong presence in developed countries, its 
performance is likely to benefit from the increased competitiveness and enhanced FSA to be 
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exploited in the foreign and home markets (Ramamurti, 2012). These effects tend to sharpen 
the benefit curve at low levels of multinationality and smooth it down at high levels of 
multinationality; this is because FSA is becoming increasingly overstretched over the 
geographically diversified operations. This is illustrated by the strengthened latent mechanism 
of multinationality benefits. In contrast, the attractiveness of developing countries is 
characterised by cheap labour and raw materials, which largely resemble that of the home 
country (Berry, 2006). Therefore, the benefits of a reduction in production costs for a 
developing country firm through investing in other developing countries are small (Qian et al., 
2008). Also, it is less likely to enhance FSA through acquiring strategic assets in developing 
countries where there are less abundant assets of this type. Therefore, the benefits are less for 
EMNEs investing in developing countries.  
On the other hand, the negative effect on firm performance increases faster at high levels 
of multinationality when EMNEs invest in developed countries. A greater foreign presence in 
developed countries makes the coordination more likely to be complex; this is due to the 
increasing differences in economic environment and locational factors among developed 
countries (Qian et al., 2008). Consequently, we could expect a steeper costs curve, where the 
costs increase much more rapidly when moving to high multinationality. This could be 
illustrated by the sharper latent curvilinear mechanism of multinationality costs. 
Subtracting such negative effects from positive effects of foreign operations in 
developed countries generates an inverted U-shaped MP relationship. When comparing the net 
effect of multinationality in developed countries with that of the baseline model, it indicates the 
different turning points of the two MP relationships. The turning point tends to shift to the left, 
together with the steepening inverted U curve, suggesting that the peak firm performance will 
occur earlier when investing in developed countries. 
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Hypothesis 2a: Multinationality has a larger positive effect on performance for 
emerging economy multinationals’ investment in developed countries than in 
developing countries.  
Hypothesis 2b: This positive effect of the investment in developed countries will switch 
to negative at lower levels of multinationality. 
 
Ownership Structure Effects 
The final concern of our paper is the important role of ownership in the MP relationship, which 
is insufficiently examined in the extant literature (Al-Obaidan and Scully, 1993). The 
multinational structure determines that the MNE can be affected by the institutional 
environment in the home and host countries (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Institutional ownership 
(private vs. state ownership) plays a vital role in EMNEs’ internationalisation (Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005). State-owned enterprises account for many listed firms in several countries 
such as in China and Singapore (Claessens and Fan, 2002). Among the large firms from the 27 
wealthiest economies where privatisation is not finished, 18% are State-owned. State ownership 
is more common in countries with bad shareholder protection, which is more likely to be the 
case in emerging economies where the institution is weak (La Porta et al., 1999). Both POEs 
(privately-owned enterprises) and SOEs (state-owned enterprises) are increasingly engaging in 
internationalisation activities (Ralston et al., 2006). It is interesting to understand their 
internationalisation activity and its performance implications. Previous empirical studies show 
that state ownership has a negative or non-linear relationship with firm’s performance (Qi et al., 
2000; Claessens and Fan, 2002). However, there is insufficient evidence regarding state-owned 
enterprise’s multinational performance. 
FDI motivations play a pivotal role in EMNEs’ international activities and their 
performance (Guillén and García-Canal, 2009). POEs tend to have commercial objectives (e.g., 
escape motive). They seek to escape the poor institution and constraints of their home country 
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and explore for a better host country condition (location-specific advantage). Most POEs are 
relatively small and constrained by an adverse competition environment in the home market 
(Boisot and Meyer, 2008). Thereby, they are more willing to escape this environment, realising 
economies of scale in a wider global market. POEs’ foreign activities tend to be motivated for 
economic reasons, suggesting that POEs internationalise for value-adding activities (Lin, 2010). 
This brings benefits to the host country, including spillover efficiency benefits (Globerman and 
Shapiro, 2009). Therefore, compared with SOEs, POEs’ FDI activities face less host 
government discrimination.  
SOEs are less likely to have an escape motive since their embeddedness in the political 
system and their relationship with government guarantees access to domestic financial 
resources (Li and Oh, 2016). Instead, SOEs have non-commercial objectives. As SOEs’ state 
ownership conflicts with the dominant ideology in the host country where the market force 
dominates the economy, their non-commercial objectives may damage the economic 
infrastructure, imposing costs and risks to the host country (Globerman and Shapiro, 2009). 
SOEs have to earn legitimacy, as institutional pressures on SOEs are particularly strong when 
they enter developed countries that have a strong institutional environment (La Porta et al., 
1999; Meyer et al., 2014). SOEs’ foreign acquisition projects are more likely to be restricted by 
the host government (Cui and Jiang, 2012). Therefore, SOEs are more likely to enter the 
developed countries through greenfield investment (Meyer et al., 2014).  
We compare the MP relationships for EMNEs with two types of ownership, namely 
private and state ownership. EMNEs’ investment in developed countries has been of particular 
interest since the recent pivotal phenomenon of POEs’ institutional escapism and SOEs’ 
investment in developed countries (Li and Oh, 2016). On the one hand, we maintain that the 
positive effect of multinationality in investment in developed countries is strengthened for 
POEs. The extent to which POEs and SOEs escape from home country institutional pressure is 
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different. POEs’ goals conflict with those of the home government and complement those of 
the host government (Li and Oh, 2016). POEs have the incentive to escape from poor home 
conditions (institutional constraints such as limited access to financial resources, political 
instability such as a massive negative consequence from allying themselves with the ‘wrong’ 
political parties, and poor intellectual property protection) and look for better host conditions; 
this is also called POEs’ institutional escapism (Witt and Lewin, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 
2015; Luiz et al., 2017; Krammer et al., 2018). By investing abroad, POEs not only avoid the 
poor institutions that limit their development in their home countries, they also gain efficiency 
improvement from operating at an international scale and develop their FSA by acquiring 
strategic assets in the host country (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015). Therefore, POEs could be 
more efficient in exploring foreign countries and benefit more from international operations 
than SOEs.  
The positive effects of multinationality on investment in developed countries are smaller 
for SOEs. SOEs are embedded in the political systems and can leverage their relationship with 
the government to mitigate the negative effect of a weak home institutional environment. SOEs’ 
internationalisation goals complement those of the home government and conflict with those of 
the host government. SOEs are therefore less likely to escape from the home country (Li and 
Oh, 2016). SOEs may have other non-commercial objectives, such as public policy goals, 
establishing a foothold, securing crucial natural resources for the home economy and acquiring 
advanced technology which may be passed to other SOEs in the military sector (Meyer et al., 
2014). These non-commercial objectives impose costs and risk to the host country. The host 
country tends to resist or discriminate against foreign SOEs’ investment (Globerman and 
Shapiro, 2009). To overcome distrust, SOEs are inclined to adapt their foreign entry strategies 
to the host’s institutional pressure. SOEs are less likely to employ acquisition as the 
establishment mode, and more likely to adopt a low ownership control mode relative to POEs 
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(Meyer et al., 2014). Therefore, SOEs tend to be less able to benefit from the enhanced FSA 
derived from the acquisition of foreign technology, and the larger internalisation benefits 
resulting from a high ownership control mode. The positive effects for POEs and SOEs are both 
expected to grow at a decreasing rate, due to the diminishing benefits of FSAs when 
overstretched in geographically-diverse operation. 
On the other hand, the negative effects of multinationality are smaller for POEs than 
SOEs. Compared with SOEs that face host country discrimination due to their non-commercial 
objectives, POEs tend to enjoy host institutional pull and face less host country discrimination 
due to their commercial objectives (e.g., profitability) which are regarded as beneficial to the 
host economy (Globerman and Shapiro, 2009). The negative effects for POEs and SOEs are 
both expected to rise at an increasing rate; this is because of the accelerating coordination costs 
and risk of resources misallocation in geographically-diverse markets. 
The differences of multinationality benefits and costs between POEs and SOEs lead to 
the different turning points of quadratic net effects. The positive effect of multinationality on 
performance is strengthened for firms under control of private ownership. It sharpens the 
benefits curve of POEs at a low multinationality level, and smooths it down at a high 
multinationality level. The negative effect is weakened for privately-owned firms. The costs 
curve for POEs is increasing at a lower rate compared with SOEs. The turning point shifts to 
the right for POEs relative to SOEs when investing in a developed country. Our research model 
is presented in Figure 1. 
Hypothesis 3a: Multinationality has a larger positive effect on performance for 
privately-owned enterprises than for state-owned enterprises when investing in 
developed countries.  
Hypothesis 3b: This positive effect will switch to negative at higher levels of 
multinationality for privately-owned enterprises relative to state-owned enterprises. 
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***FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
METHOD 
Data 
Company data are collected from Orbis dataset whose information is maintained by a 
consultancy called Bureau van Dijck. It provides MNEs’ detailed accounting information, 
parent-subsidiary ownership links, and locations of subsidiaries. We select EMNEs that have 
an ownership stake of minimum 10.01% (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1999) of its foreign 
subsidiaries and have information about subsidiaries’ location. Such that, we can calculate a 
key explanatory variable MULT (multinationality, calculated as overseas/total subsidiaries). 
Information is available from 2004 to 2013. 
We select firms that have data available on return on assets, employees, leverage, sales, 
parent’s ownership structure, parent’s ownership stake of subsidiaries and their locations. 
Country-level data (GDP per capita and GDP growth, institution) are collected from World 
Bank sources. Firms with missing values for any of these variables are excluded. In the panel 
dataset, on average, each firm has 3.2 years observations. All monetary measures are reported 
in US dollars. The final sample includes 1,321 firms with 4,227 observations from 44 emerging 
economies. Our panel data allow us to examine the dynamic relationships within the data, which 
is not possible with pure cross-sectional data as in many prior studies (Wooldridge, 2010). 
 
The Empirical Specification 
Multiple regression models with fixed effects estimators are employed. Following the empirical 
specification of several scholar’s works (Contractor et al., 2003; Ruigrok et al., 2007), we use 
multiple regression models to test the above three hypotheses. We compare the fixed effects 
estimates and random effects estimates using misspecification test. The results reject random 
effects application (Hausman, 1978). Thus multiple regression models with fixed effects 
estimators are employed. 
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To examine the inverted U-shaped MP relationship (hypothesis 1), the following 
equations are presented.  
                                         ( )
2
it 1 it 2 it it t itY  = MULT  + MULT  + X  + e    + ,                               (1) 
It is important to include the second-order term in the equation. A significant negative 
β2 indicates an inverted U-shaped relationship, while a significant positive β2 suggests a U-
shaped relationship (Meyer, 2009; Lind and Mehlum, 2010; Haans et al., 2016). 
To examine the impact of location decision and ownership structure on MP relationship 
(hypotheses 2-3), the following equation is introduced.  
  ( ) ( )' ' ' '
2 2
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it 3 it 4 it 5 it 6 it it t itY  = MULT  + MULT  + MULT  + MULT  + X  + e      + ,  (2) 
We again include the second-order terms of (MULTD’ED and MULTD’IND) in equation 2 
to test the curvilinear MP relationship when considering location choice. The main focus is the 
term β4 with respect to hypotheses 2-3. The main variables in the above equations are explained 
as follows. 
Dependent variable. Yit refers to the firm performance. In this paper, it is measured by 
return on assets. Return on assets (the ratio of net income to total assets (Lu and Beamish, 2004)) 
has been widely used in the previous MP literature (Lu and Beamish, 2004; Ruigrok et al., 2007; 
Qian et al., 2008).  
Explanatory variables. This paper uses the number of overseas subsidiaries divided by 
total number of subsidiaries as a proxy for multinationality (MULT) (Yang et al., 2013; 
Castellani et al., 2017). Other scholars have used different measures1 of multinationality. The 
most common measure is FSTS (foreign/total sales). FSTS does not distinguish between 
exports and sales from overseas production. Further, after exploiting the data availability of 
Orbis, we found difficulty in identifying foreign sales subtracting exporting and licensing when 
using FSTS measure. FATA (foreign/total assets) does not take account of internationalisation 
through exports and is highly correlated with FSTS (Annavarjula et al., 2006). Therefore, FSTS 
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and FATA are ruled out. Meanwhile, OSTS does not distinguish business production and sales 
subsidiaries, or take into account the size of the subsidiaries. Though OSTS is not perfect, it is 
the only feasible measure using Orbis dataset because Orbis has the information about the 
number of subsidiaries and their locations.  
In order to capture the effects of different location choices of FDI on MP relationship, 
particularly considering the developed and developing countries (Berry, 2006) defined by the 
(World Bank, 2013), we create two more variables, namely MULTitD’ED and MULTitD’ING, 
which are defined as the number of foreign subsidiaries in developed (developing) nations 
divided by total number of subsidiaries. The developed (developing) nations are defined as 
high-income (middle- and low-income) countries in the (World Bank, 2013).  
Control variables. Following prior work (Geringer et al., 2000), several variables that 
are known to affect business performance and be correlated with multinationality are controlled 
in the empirical models, represented by Xit, involving employee count, leverage and sales per 
worker. Firms with large size (SIZE) (Zahra et al., 2000) tend to perform better than small firm. 
Leverage (LEV) (Qian et al., 2008) is expected to have a negative impact on firm performance, 
since risky debt results in firm’s sub-optimal investment strategy. Firms with high labour 
productivity (PROD) are more likely to have higher performance than firms with low labour 
productivity (Al-Obaidan and Scully, 1993). Firm age (AGE), as a proxy for experience, may 
affect the level of learning, international activities and multinational performance (Zahra et al., 
2000). We control firm’s home country characteristics, including GDP per capita (ECON) and 
GDP growth (GROW) (Li and Qian, 2005), retrieved from World Development Indicators 
(WDI). Home and host institutional dimensions are included since FDI escapes from home 
countries with poor institution and is attracted to countries with good institution (Li and Oh, 
2016). We adopt the widely used Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Cuervo-Cazurra 
and Genc, 2008; Driffield et al., 2016) provided by Kaufmann et al. (2009). Following prior 
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studies (Kolstad and Wiig, 2012), we employ voice and accountability in the analysis since it 
captures the perception of the extent to which the citizens are able to participate in selecting the 
government, freedom of expression, association and free media (Kaufmann et al., 2009). We 
also use other dimensions of WGI to measure institutional quality and find similar results 
(available upon request). The quality of the home country institution (HOMI) is measured by 
voice and accountability for the EMNE’s home countries. The quality of the host country 
institutions (HOSI) is measured by the average score of voice and accountability for the 
EMNE’s host countries. In addition, firm performance may be affected by unobserved 
macroeconomic factors over the period. Therefore, we control for time fixed-effects γ (Yang et 
al., 2013). We also control for firm fixed-effects (Berry, 2006). Table 1 provides definitions 
and sources of data for the variables included in the empirical models.  
***TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics. On average, an emerging economy multinational has 
57 percent subsidiaries locating in overseas countries. It sets up 36 percent subsidiaries in 
overseas developed countries, 22 percent subsidiaries in overseas developing countries. We 
also find that, on average, return on assets is 5.21%, labour force is 12,663, labour productivity 
is US$ 1,141.91 thousand, leverage is 73% and age is 29.47. As shown in the right panel, most 
of the correlation coefficients are low. 
***TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
The data cover 177 economies, including 44 home emerging economies 2  and 177 host 
economies3. Table 3 presents the home economy list and the mean value for key variables by 
each economy, including Y, MULT, MULTD'ED, MULTD'IND and SIZE. Unsurprisingly,  the 
parents are concentrated on large emerging economies, with significant numbers in the BRICS 
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economies (a major emerging economies group that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) (Holtbrügge and Kreppel, 2012), which comprise 33% of all parents in the sample. 
The host economy list (available upon request) shows that the EMNEs’ top host locations (as 
measured by the greatest number of foreign subsidiaries) are China, Hong Kong, US, British 
Virgin Islands, Russia, UK, Singapore, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Australia, Germany, Brazil and South Korea. 
***TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE*** 
Figure 2 offers a better understanding of our data coverage and FDI location choices. Our data 
cover 177 economies. 44 emerging economies have both parent and subsidiary information (in 
black). 133 economies have only subsidiary information (in light grey). Economies with no 
information are in blank. As we can see from Figure 2, most emerging markets locate in East 
Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), South Africa and Latin 
America. The emerging economies’ FDIs flow into developed economies (mainly in North 
America, Western Europe, Oceania and Japan), developing economies (mainly in Central Asia, 
Middle East and Africa), and flow among emerging economies. 
***FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Regression Results 
Regression models with fixed-effects estimators are employed. We control for firm and time 
fixed effects. Table 4 shows the main results. One column represents one model. There are 
4,227 observations in the full sample. Most control variables are significant and have the 
expected signs. For instance, firm size (SIZE) and labour productivity (PROD) have significant 
positive coefficients, suggesting large firms and firms with high labour productivity perform 
better. Moreover, these signs remain largely unchanged across different specifications in 
Models 1-8.  
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Models 1-2 in Table 4 are to test hypothesis 1. The key variable of our interest is MULT. 
Following prior work that studies the curvilinear relationship (Chang and Park, 2005), we 
gradually add the higher-order terms into the models. In Model 1, which assumes the linear 
relationship, we find a significant positive sign of MULT, suggesting multinationality has 
positive impact on firm performance.  
***TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
We add the squared term of MULT in Model 2 to test the curvilinear relationship. The 
F-test comparing two models indicates that the Model 2 is significantly (at 10 percent level) 
better than Model 1 by introducing the squared term of MULT.  We find (from Model 2) the 
negative sign of squared term (significant at 10% level) and positive sign of linear term 
(significant at 5% level), which suggest there is inverted U-shaped MP relationship. The 
optimal level is 69.66%. This indicates that EMNEs can benefit from investing in overseas 
countries initially, although the costs will exceed benefits when the firm has 69.66% 
subsidiaries locating in overseas countries. Overall, Models 1-2 support the hypothesis 1 and 
confirm an inverted U-shaped MP relationship for EMNEs. As EMNEs become more 
experienced, they do not greatly differ from DMNEs. EMNEs are increasingly able to rely on 
stronger firm-specific assets as a result of the co-evolution of their firm-specific advantages and 
the home country national innovation system. Meanwhile, coordination costs are accelerating 
at high level of multinationality. Hence, it is unsurprising to see that EMNEs have inverted U-
shaped MP relationship that is similar to the results of DMNEs (Hitt et al., 1997), but additional 
factors (e.g., location choice and ownership structure) still matter for EMNEs. 
Models 3-8 are used to test hypotheses 2a and 2b. We divide MULT into two parts, 
namely MULTD’ED and MULTD’IND. Models 3-4 and 5-6 show separately the performance 
implications of developed and developing country subsidiaries. In Models 7-8, when we control 
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for MULTD’ED, MULTD’IND and their higher-order terms, the developed MULT’s coefficients 
have much clearer pattern of positive relationship in linear model and inverted U-shaped 
relationship in curvilinear model, compared with developing country subsidiaries whose 
coefficients are not significant. We interpret that developed countries’ subsidiaries have a 
significant positive effect on firm performance. This positive effect will switch to negative at a 
multinationality of 54.04%. Therefore hypotheses 2a and 2b are supported. Developed 
countries have abundant technological resource and strong institutional protection on 
investment and intellectual property. This helps EMNEs enhance their FSAs by acquiring new 
resources and competence that are not available in the home country. Their enhanced FSAs 
strengthens the positive effect of multinationality on performance. However, the coordination 
costs increase faster at high level of multinationality in developed countries, due to the 
increasing difference in economic environment and locational factors among developed 
countries. Therefore, the positive effect of developed country subsidiaries will switch to 
negative at lower level of multinationality.   
Table 5 is to test hypotheses 3a and 3b, whether ownership structure matters in MP 
relationship. We rerun equations 1-2, but using two subsamples. The first subsample consists 
of 1,206 POEs. The second subsample consists of 115 SOEs. The difference in these two 
numbers is reasonable because SOEs is usually the minority group in emerging economies after 
economic reform. However, this minority group often plays an important role in emerging 
economies and are increasingly investing abroad (Ralston et al., 2006). 
***TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Models 1-4 report the results for POEs. We again find that investing in foreign countries 
has a significant positive effect on firm performance at initial stage. The positive linear and 
negative quadratic term are significant at 5% level and 10% level respectively, suggesting there 
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is an inverted U-shaped MP relationship for POEs. Similar to the results in full sample, setting 
up subsidiaries in developed countries enhances firm’s performance, while investing in 
developing countries does not have significant effect on firm performance. The turning point is 
55.59% for the privately-owned enterprises’ overseas developed country investment.  
Models 5-8 present the results for state-owned emerging MNEs. The number of 
observations drops substantially, which may have implications with respect to the statistical 
significance of the results. We find no significant linear MP relationship. We find significant 
quadratic relationship when considering FDI location choice. We find foreign presence in 
developed countries has an inverted U-shaped relationship with SOEs’ performance, whose 
turning point is 47.89%. Overall, these results indicate that POEs have large positive effect of 
foreign operation on performance, and this positive effect switch to negative at higher level of 
multinationality relative to SOEs. Thus hypotheses 3a and 3b are supported. 
To check the robustness of our primary results, we perform several robustness tests. 
First, in some curvilinear relationships, the relative strength of two counteracting effects might 
vary several times throughout the range of variable, suggesting higher function forms (e.g., 
cubic). For instance, in S-shaped relationship, the negative effect dominates at low and high 
levels while the positive effect dominates at moderate level (Meyer, 2009). To check whether 
the relationship is perhaps cubic rather than quadratic, following Haans et al. (2016) and Meyer 
(2009), we added a cubic term and propose the following equation. The results (available upon 
request) show that the cubic term is not significant and did not improve the model fit, thus 
strongly supporting the quadratic relationship.  
                          ( ) ( )
2 3
it 7 it 8 it 9 it it t itY  = MULT  + MULT  + MULT  + X  + e     + ,                      (3) 
Second, we break the sample period to investigate a possible evolution of the MP 
relationship over time. The results (available upon request) show that there is a U-shaped MP 
relationship during a period of 2004-2007, while an inverted U-shaped MP relationship over a 
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period of 2008-2013 (though the coefficient on the quadratic term is marginally significant at 
15% level). A possible explanation might come from Contractor et al. (2007). They propose a 
“stages” model which suggests that firms make losses due to the huge set-up costs at the initial 
internationalisation stage, obtain profits later because of various benefits of multinationality, 
and experience again negative performance resulting from accelerating coordination costs when 
internationalise too much. Therefore, the first part of U-shaped and the second part of inverted 
U-shape MP relationship might jointly form the S-shaped relationship. They find a U-shaped 
relationship for the Indian firms in the period 1997-2001, and suggested that this might be the 
first part of an S-shaped relationship, while the second part (i.e. inverted U-shaped) would have 
arisen later with the development of the EMNEs. It may well be that our analysis is capturing 
the second part of this S-shaped relationship.  
Given the fast evolution of EMNEs (Elia and Santangelo, 2017), the MP relationship 
might have evolved over time and EMNEs has experienced the first part in 2004-2007 and 
reached the second part in 2008-2013. However, our results indicate that the majority of 
EMNEs and time period (six years out of ten-year time span) may occupy the second part, 
suggesting an initial upward slope and followed by a downward slope of multinationality’s 
effect on firm performance (an inverted U-shaped relationship). Also, we consider different 
ownership threshold. We restrict our sample by only including foreign subsidiaries whose 
minimum 25.01% equity is owned by parent (Yang et al., 2013). The results (available upon 
request) reaffirm that EMNEs’ investment in overseas countries has a positive effect on 
performance before a certain level of multinationality. 
 Next, FDI is a strategic decision of firms, so endogeneity should be taken into account. 
Perhaps better-performing firms invest more in overseas countries. The use of firm fixed-effects 
can certainly alleviate these estimation problems. Further, we conduct a robustness check by 
lagging all independent variables and rerun the analysis. Though this method cannot fully 
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resolve the endogeneity issue, it does mitigate the reverse causality problem (Lin, 2014). The 
results (available upon request) show that the inverted U-shaped MP relationship largely 
remains in different lag models, including from one-year to three-year lag models. 
In addition, there are potential issues in using the ratio of the foreign subsidiary count 
to total subsidiaries count. We consider the fact that a firm (A) with one domestic and one 
foreign subsidiary has the same multinationality as the other firm (B) with 10 domestic and ten 
foreign subsidiaries. To address this issue, we consider a set of alternative multinationality 
measure, including OS (the number of overseas subsidiaries), OC (the number of overseas 
countries), and FSTS (The ratio of overseas majority-owned subsidiaries’ sales to all majority-
owned subsidiaries’ sales). The results (available upon request) show that there is a U-shaped 
relationship for developed country subsidiaries when measured by OS, given the negative linear 
term and positive quadratic term, and the quadratic term is significant. Moreover, we consider 
alternative performance measures, namely ROS (return on sales), ROE (return on equity), net 
profit and gross profit. The results (available upon request) reaffirm the inverted U-shaped MP 
relationship, particularly in the case of developed countries subsidiaries. Finally, we expand 
and explore further the effect of ownership structure on the returns from multinationality, 
particularly by considering POEs’ characteristics such as industrial context (high-tech vs. low-
tech sectors; manufacturing vs. service sectors) (Mayer et al., 2015; Berry and Kaul, 2016). 
Generally, these results (available upon request) support that the significance of inverted U-
shaped MP relationship varies across industrial contexts. The turning points also vary for these 
different types of POEs. 
Overall, we regard the results of robustness tests as supportive to our primary finding. 
Developed country subsidiaries play a more important role in enhancing EMNEs’ performance 
than developing country subsidiaries before a certain level of multinationality.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The extant literature on the MP relationship has been largely limited to MNEs from developed 
economies (mainly US firms) and to some individual emerging economies (e.g., India). In this 
paper we present empirical evidence for MNEs from various emerging economies. Moreover, 
although location advantage is emphasised in eclectic theory, surprisingly most MP literature 
disregards the huge differences between developed and developing countries and uses an 
aggregate multinationality measure. In addition, ownership structure is rarely considered in 
previous MP studies, while institutional ownerships (private vs. state ownership) plays a vital 
role in multinational performance. From an institutional perspective, POEs and SOEs are 
affected differently by home and host institutional environment when they go abroad. Finally, 
most of the data used in extant MP papers are cross-sectional in nature. This prevents those 
papers from controlling unobserved firm fixed effects and analysing the dynamic nature of the 
multinationality over time. These research gaps are filled in this paper by using a panel data 
from a sample that includes 1,321 multinationals from 44 emerging economies over a period 
from 2004 to 2013.  
This paper provides new empirical evidence on emerging economy MNEs, contributing 
to the existing MP literature, highlighting the importance of FDI location and ownership 
structure. First, our main finding is that while a general positive pattern exists in EMNEs’ MP 
relationship, this positive relationship is strengthened in the case of developed country 
subsidiaries. These results are to some extent consistent with Berry (2006) and Qian et al. 
(2008)’s finding, suggesting that investing in developed countries could strengthen the 
performance enhancement arising from foreign operation.  
Our results emphasise the great benefits of foreign operation to EMNEs’ performance, 
particularly for foreign operation in developed countries, before the optimal level of 
multinationality. EMNEs have their unique FSA that mainly derives from CSA, such as the 
adaptation skills of the available technology, and the ability to utilise and upgrade the 
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capabilities. EMNEs are also developing western MNEs’ traditional FSA (e.g., latest 
technology, brand and managerial skills) through acquiring foreign strategic assets. The 
positive effect of FSA help EMNEs realise the multinationality benefits at the initial stage of 
internationalisation. Therefore, it is unsurprising to find that EMNEs have inverted U-shaped 
MP relationship that is similar to the results of DMNEs (Hitt et al., 1997). However, additional 
factors, such as location choice and ownership structure, is relevant in EMNEs. Also, given the 
possible evolution of MP relationship over time, it may well be that the EMNEs’ MP 
relationship has evolved from the U shape during 1997-2001 in Contractor et al. (2007)’s study 
to inverted U shape during 2004-2013 in our paper. The majority of the EMNEs in our analysis 
might occupy the second part of an S-shaped relationship that is proposed by Contractor et al. 
(2003).  
Moreover, the advanced countries are associated with high technological capability and 
institutional conditions, and this facilitates the extent of knowledge flows from host country to 
home country (Martins and Yang, 2009; Driffield et al., 2016), leading to performance 
improvement. Hence, regarding the FDI location strategy, emerging market multinationals are 
advised to set up a moderate number of overseas subsidiaries in developed countries. We find 
that the positive effect of developed country subsidiaries will switch to negative occurs at 
certain level of multinationality (54.04%) due to increasing coordination costs. Qian et al. 
(2008), for instance, find that diversification into a moderate number of developed countries 
benefits firm performance. 
The final results suggest the important effect of ownership structure on EMNEs’ 
multinational performance. It indicates the relative success of POEs in the foreign expansion, 
compared with SOEs. The positive effect of multinationality is strengthened for the EMNEs 
who are privately-owned. The turning point shifts to higher level of multinationality for POEs 
(55.59%), compared with SOEs (47.89%). In the face of home country’s institutional pressure 
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and host country’s institutional pull, POEs are motivated to escape from the adverse 
institutional environment and benefit from the better conditions in developed countries. In 
contrast, SOEs are embedded in the favourable home institutional environment and have to 
adapt their entry strategies when entering developed country due to their poor political image. 
They are less likely to adopt acquisition as the establishment mode due to the host institutional 
pressure. Therefore, they are less able to obtain the benefit of the enhanced FSA from the 
acquisition of foreign strategic assets (e.g., foreign technology). This provides some evidence 
on POEs’ institutional escapism and SOEs’ investment in developed countries (Li and Oh, 
2016). We believe our findings provide an understanding of EMNEs’ internationalisation 
behaviour. There is a surge of FDI outflow from emerging economies since 2000 (UNCTAD, 
2017). We also believe it has some important managerial implications. It helps to explain, for 
instance, why emerging economy firms are actively investing in developed countries, as well 
as why POEs are more successful in the expansion to developed countries than SOEs.  
Although this paper advances the research on firm’s foreign investment behaviour by 
unveiling its complex performance implications under important underlying factors such as 
location choice and ownership structure. This research is not free of certain limitations that may 
point to interesting further research directions. First, our multinationality-performance study 
currently focuses on emerging economy multinational enterprise. It may prove interesting for 
future study to estimate an MP model with data from both emerging economy and developed 
economy multinational enterprises so as to test for differences between the two groups. In 
addition, FDI is a strategic decision of firms, so the endogeneity issue needs to be properly 
addressed. Perhaps better-performing firms are more likely to go abroad and can afford to 
establish overseas subsidiaries. Our estimates do not rule out some form of reverse causality. 
In addition, our analysis covers a period until 2013. Given the rapid and evolving phenomenon 
of EMNEs, further research could seek to extend our study by repeating the same tests for more 
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recent years and investigate the causal relationship between multinationality and performance. 
Lastly, we have considered the industry context of privately-owned firms, such as comparing 
high-tech/low-tech and manufacturing/service sectors. Future research avenues are encouraged 
to expand and explored further by considering characteristics of these privately-owned firms 
such as size and experience. We leave these topics for further research. 
 
1 For thorough review of different measures see Hassel et al. (2003). 
2 These 44 emerging economies include Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, South, Korea, 
Romania, Russia, Saudi, Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri, Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, 
Ukraine, UAE, Vietnam. To capture the largest possible country coverage of the emerging economy group, the 
country grouping is based on the definitions provided by several institutions (IMF, BRICS+NEXT Eleven, FTSE, 
MSCI, S&P, EM bond index, Dow Jones, Russell, Columbia University EMGP) and prior studies (Bebenroth and 
Hemmert, 2015). 
3The 177 host countries include Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbud, Argentina, Armenia, 
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bermuda, 
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cayman Islands, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Congo, Congo Democratic, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Curacao, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Gibraltar, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, 
HongKong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall 
Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova Republic, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, 
Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, 
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania United Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, UAE, UK, US, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Figure 1: The Research Model  
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Figure 2: Country Coverage 
 
Note: Our data cover 177 countries. We have 44 economies with both parent and subsidiary information (in 
black). We have 133 countries with only subsidiary information (in light grey). Countries with no information 
are in blank. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Operationalization of Variables 
Variable Operationalisation Source 
Y The firm’s return on assets using net income (%) Orbis 
MULT The ratio of the number of overseas subsidiaries to total number 
of subsidiaries 
Orbis 
MULTD’ED The ratio of the number of subsidiaries in overseas developed 
countries to total number of subsidiaries 
Orbis 
MULTD’ING The ratio of the number of subsidiaries in overseas developing 
countries to total number of subsidiaries 
Orbis 
SIZE The natural logarithm of the firm’s number of employees Orbis 
LEV The firm’s debt to equity ratio Orbis 
PROD The natural logarithm of the firm’s sales divided by the number 
of employees (US$) 
Orbis 
AGE The age of the firm (in years) since the date of establishment Orbis 
ECON The natural logarithm of the home country’s GDP per capita 
(US$) 
WDI 
GROW The home country’s GDP annual growth rate (%) WDI 
HOMI The “voice and accountability” score for the home country of 
the EMNE 
WGI 
HOSI The average “voice and accountability” score for host countries 
in which the EMNE has subsidiaries 
WGI 
Note: We take the natural logarithm of employee count, labour productivity, firm age and GDP per capita (plus 1 since the 
logarithm is not defined for zero) (Majocchi and Strange, 2012) in order to normalise their distribution. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Y 5.21 9.30 1            
2. MULT 0.57 0.26 -0.01 1           
3. MULTD’ED 0.36 0.25 -0.04 0.54 1          
4. MULTD’ING 0.22 0.24 0.03 0.51 -0.45 1         
5. SIZE 7.79 2.13 0.05 0.15 0.09 0.07 1        
6. LEV 0.73 0.60 -0.29 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.14 1       
7. PROD 12.43 1.30 0.07 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.23 0.11 1      
8. AGE 3.11 0.78 -0.01 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.04 0.02 1     
9. ECON 9.31 0.94 -0.08 0.19 -0.02 0.22 -0.24 -0.06 0.15 0.10 1    
10. GROW 4.32 5.06 0.11 -0.13 0.04 -0.18 0.28 0.03 -0.08 -0.16 -0.47 1   
11. HOMI 0.03 1.00 0.03 0.22 -0.02 0.26 -0.31 -0.11 0.11 0.27 0.54 -0.59 1  
12. HOSI 0.31 0.97 0.02 -0.20 0.25 -0.47 -0.13 -0.07 0.04 -0.13 -0.12 -0.04 0.08 1 
Note: There are 4,227 observations. All correlation coefficients have a value of above 0.11 are at least significant at 10% level. 
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Table 3: Number of Firms and Key Variables by EMNEs’ Home Economy 
Country N Y MULT MULTD'ED MULTD'ING SIZE 
Argentina 3 11.80 0.43 0.14 0.29 9,064 
Bahrain 1 13.51 0.72 0.44 0.28 532 
Brazil 28 5.77 0.58 0.31 0.27 24,022 
Bulgaria 24 5.75 0.38 0.21 0.17 610 
Chile 13 5.04 0.57 0.08 0.49 3,045 
China 260 4.33 0.43 0.37 0.07 21,579 
Colombia 10 5.10 0.68 0.15 0.53 6,930 
Czech Republic 123 6.34 0.47 0.41 0.07 1,885 
Egypt 3 17.48 0.69 0.41 0.28 22,965 
Estonia 39 5.42 0.55 0.10 0.44 675 
Greece 81 2.29 0.63 0.32 0.30 3,309 
Hong Kong 87 4.85 0.72 0.32 0.40 17,803 
Hungary 11 7.17 0.76 0.40 0.36 7,995 
India 62 9.76 0.80 0.55 0.26 23,901 
Indonesia 13 3.41 0.51 0.33 0.18 7,840 
Israel 36 0.81 0.81 0.66 0.15 2,403 
Jordan 2 2.78 0.65 0.40 0.25 80 
Kuwait 24 0.76 0.75 0.50 0.25 4,521 
Latvia 21 3.44 0.59 0.35 0.24 452 
Lithuania 23 8.13 0.53 0.21 0.32 956 
Malaysia 20 6.06 0.67 0.46 0.21 19,106 
Mexico 18 5.60 0.44 0.23 0.20 26,725 
Morocco 2 15.85 0.62 0.06 0.57 12,147 
Nigeria 1 2.57 0.71 0.48 0.23 587 
Oman 5 4.97 0.56 0.39 0.18 2,999 
Pakistan 3 -1.21 0.34 0.05 0.29 2,385 
Peru 2 16.92 0.54 0.17 0.38 3,803 
Philippines 15 7.49 0.62 0.42 0.20 9,929 
Poland 73 7.19 0.52 0.35 0.18 4,958 
Qatar 4 12.54 0.57 0.47 0.10 1,929 
Romania 10 3.53 0.44 0.13 0.31 7,348 
Russia 38 8.05 0.40 0.24 0.16 34,325 
Saudi Arabia 10 3.97 0.72 0.44 0.28 6,305 
Singapore 30 6.12 0.76 0.34 0.43 22,802 
Slovakia 9 3.33 0.46 0.45 0.01 2,090 
Slovenia 22 2.54 0.68 0.33 0.34 4,423 
South Africa 47 7.60 0.78 0.40 0.38 22,117 
South Korea 76 5.06 0.54 0.40 0.14 7,192 
Sri Lanka 10 4.24 0.46 0.15 0.31 10,596 
Thailand 5 10.31 0.37 0.03 0.34 9,410 
Turkey 36 5.13 0.56 0.34 0.22 10,795 
UAE 13 2.42 0.76 0.44 0.32 8,859 
Ukraine 7 5.92 0.15 0.05 0.10 2,557 
Vietnam 1 11.24 0.83 0.17 0.67 1,188 
Note: N is the number of firms. The home economies include 44 emerging economies.
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Table 4: EMNEs’ Multinational Performance: The Role of Location Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MULT 2.5582* 9.9281**       
 (1.408) (3.945)       
MULT2  -7.1263*       
  (3.744)       
MULTD’ED   2.2987 10.8318**   2.9213* 10.9225** 
   (1.438) (4.376)   (1.566) (4.426) 
(MULTD’ED)2    -10.6637**    -10.1055** 
    (5.053)    (4.944) 
MULTD’ING     0.8944 3.0772 2.0329 2.6255 
     (1.712) (4.200) (1.854) (4.122) 
(MULTD’ING)2      -3.1059  -1.2616 
      (4.826)  (4.808) 
SIZE 2.2328*** 2.2355*** 2.2479*** 2.2236*** 2.2589*** 2.2547*** 2.2330*** 2.2105*** 
 (0.783) (0.788) (0.787) (0.788) (0.787) (0.785) (0.783) (0.784) 
LEV -6.3557*** -6.3572*** -6.3444*** -6.3984*** -6.3686*** -6.3832*** -6.3499*** -6.4061*** 
 (0.681) (0.678) (0.681) (0.680) (0.682) (0.682) (0.681) (0.679) 
PROD 2.3473*** 2.3635*** 2.3593*** 2.3523*** 2.3576*** 2.3532*** 2.3493*** 2.3423*** 
 (0.839) (0.846) (0.843) (0.848) (0.846) (0.844) (0.839) (0.844) 
AGE -1.3023 -1.5197 -1.5218 -1.4345 -1.3654 -1.3507 -1.3613 -1.2959 
 (1.370) (1.374) (1.355) (1.335) (1.356) (1.352) (1.356) (1.334) 
ECON 0.4509 0.3620 0.3873 0.5353 0.3477 0.3502 0.4486 0.5811 
 (1.195) (1.187) (1.194) (1.178) (1.197) (1.197) (1.193) (1.179) 
GROW 0.2511*** 0.2524*** 0.2526*** 0.2529*** 0.2542*** 0.2550*** 0.2510*** 0.2519*** 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
HOMI -3.2832 -3.1484 -3.1043 -3.0587 -3.1126 -3.0920 -3.2559 -3.1825 
 (2.129) (2.120) (2.115) (2.091) (2.139) (2.134) (2.141) (2.114) 
HOSI 0.2557 0.2403 0.0279 -0.0485 0.1962 0.2589 0.1935 0.1224 
 (0.353) (0.353) (0.331) (0.326) (0.367) (0.392) (0.365) (0.376) 
Adj R-squared 0.135 0.136 0.135 0.136 0.134 0.134 0.135 0.136 
No. observation 4227 4227 4227 4227 4227 4227 4227 4227 
F statistics 11.850 11.471 12.549 11.912 12.321 11.744 12.164 11.089 
Note: Return on assets is the dependent variable. All models control for firm and time fixed effects. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: *0.1; **0.05; ***0.01. 
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Table 5: EMNEs’ Multinational Performance: The Role of Ownership Structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 POE POE POE POE SOE SOE SOE SOE 
MULT 2.8166* 11.2609**   1.3810 3.5459   
 (1.606) (4.455)   (1.984) (5.539)   
MULT2  -8.1080*    -2.1667   
  (4.137)    (5.794)   
MULTD’ED   3.3480* 11.3095**   1.0219 9.7232* 
   (1.804) (4.914)   (1.971) (5.091) 
(MULTD’ED)2    -10.1729*    -10.1519** 
    (5.546)    (5.039) 
MULTD’ING   2.0553 2.3824   1.9860 2.7645 
   (2.070) (4.718)   (3.008) (5.214) 
(MULTD’ING)2    -1.0670    -0.6461 
    (5.647)    (5.825) 
SIZE 2.2123*** 2.2220*** 2.2095*** 2.1698*** 1.9906** 1.9806** 1.9704** 2.1051** 
 (0.822) (0.828) (0.822) (0.820) (0.867) (0.885) (0.864) (0.856) 
LEV -6.5385*** -6.5407*** -6.5330*** -6.5899*** -4.6802*** -4.6748*** -4.6968*** -4.6820*** 
 (0.747) (0.743) (0.747) (0.745) (1.273) (1.279) (1.281) (1.268) 
PROD 2.3228*** 2.3416*** 2.3230*** 2.3168*** 2.0778** 2.0821** 2.0519** 2.0396** 
 (0.867) (0.875) (0.866) (0.872) (0.806) (0.812) (0.796) (0.789) 
AGE -1.7907 -1.9875 -1.8970 -1.7611 -1.3722 -1.4693 -1.2966 -1.7421 
 (1.827) (1.820) (1.811) (1.803) (1.517) (1.561) (1.486) (1.440) 
ECON 0.2509 0.1196 0.2577 0.3615 1.8995 1.8883 1.9875 2.3259 
 (1.400) (1.388) (1.400) (1.387) (1.611) (1.617) (1.762) (1.685) 
GROW 0.2690*** 0.2714*** 0.2692*** 0.2698*** 0.1181 0.1152 0.1228 0.1244 
 (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.107) (0.106) (0.109) (0.109) 
HOMI -4.3067* -4.1880* -4.2874* -4.2096* 1.2872 1.3493 1.2818 1.2436 
 (2.462) (2.451) (2.471) (2.462) (3.274) (3.224) (3.243) (3.022) 
HOSI 0.4588 0.4303 0.3575 0.2478 -0.8333** -0.8240** -0.8096** -0.7206** 
 (0.410) (0.410) (0.436) (0.450) (0.370) (0.362) (0.362) (0.345) 
Adj R-squared 0.136 0.137 0.136 0.137 0.213 0.211 0.211 0.216 
No. observation 3768 3768 3768 3768 459 459 459 459 
F statistics 10.868 10.561 11.159 10.259 3.688 3.636 4.896 4.373 
Note: Return on assets is the dependent variable. All models control for firm and time fixed effects. Models 1-4 include POEs. Models 5-8 include SOEs.  Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance 
levels: *0.1; **0.05; ***0.01. 
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APPENDIX A (Containing results that are available upon request) 
Table A1: Number of Firms and Key Variables by EMNEs’ Host Economies 
Country N Ownership 
Afghanistan 2 95.21 
Albania 25 83.99 
Algeria 14 68.73 
Angola 13 78.73 
Antigua and Barbud 3 100.00 
Argentina 124 69.72 
Armenia 10 72.66 
Australia 435 87.33 
Austria 111 87.10 
Azerbaijan 13 67.63 
Bahamas 6 82.82 
Bahrain 67 66.83 
Bangladesh 24 67.98 
Barbados 1 100.00 
Belarus 27 71.97 
Belgium 91 82.77 
Benin 5 92.40 
Bermuda 107 69.51 
Bolivia 4 70.29 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 42 74.00 
Botswana 51 92.37 
Brazil 360 68.99 
British Virgin Islands 1076 88.36 
Brunei 12 79.62 
Bulgaria 290 79.30 
Burkina Faso 3 73.83 
Burundi 1 100.00 
Cambodia 18 73.28 
Cameroon 8 81.52 
Canada 178 71.94 
Cayman Islands 220 78.27 
Central African Republic 1 100.00 
Chile 134 78.56 
China 3605 71.35 
Colombia 78 63.63 
Congo 9 93.52 
Congo Democratic 7 64.42 
Costa Rica 12 68.90 
Cote d'Ivoire 8 77.91 
Croatia 66 78.52 
Curacao 10 90.30 
Cyprus 304 89.36 
Czech Republic 438 84.97 
Denmark 38 65.37 
Note: N is the number of firms. The host economies include 177 economies. “Ownership” refers to the average 
equity stake held by EMNEs in their subsidiaries. 
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Table A1: Number of Firms and Key Variables by EMNEs’ Host Economies [Continued] 
Country N Ownership 
Djibouti 3 60.00 
Dominican Republic 8 65.14 
Ecuador 18 72.78 
Egypt 130 76.63 
El Salvador 7 83.33 
Estonia 156 72.62 
Ethiopia 2 75.38 
Fiji 2 91.83 
Finland 37 75.17 
France 171 82.12 
Gabon 2 50.78 
Gambia 1 40.00 
Georgia 21 75.55 
Germany 413 84.25 
Ghana 25 79.73 
Gibraltar 4 86.39 
Greece 264 61.53 
Guatemala 14 64.65 
Guinea 4 71.14 
Guinea-Bissau 2 88.75 
Haiti 1 50.01 
Honduras 7 81.77 
Hong Kong 1434 86.07 
Hungary 119 81.63 
Iceland 3 66.17 
India 312 65.33 
Indonesia 318 77.73 
Iran 10 56.15 
Iraq 10 62.56 
Ireland 67 84.69 
Israel 84 69.24 
Italy 134 80.62 
Jamaica 3 54.27 
Japan 132 77.54 
Jordan 44 71.95 
Kazakhstan 56 70.68 
Kenya 32 79.35 
Kosovo 7 66.61 
Kuwait 59 38.44 
Kyrgyzstan 5 50.20 
Laos 9 71.56 
Latvia 118 84.78 
Lebanon 41 93.37 
Lesotho 14 92.43 
Liberia 83 90.39 
Note: N is the number of firms. The host economies include 177 economies. “Ownership” refers to the average 
equity stake held by EMNEs in their subsidiaries. 
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Table A1: Number of Firms and Key Variables by EMNEs’ Host Economies [Continued] 
Country N Ownership 
Libya 6 62.68 
Liechtenstein 2 69.99 
Lithuania 132 83.38 
Luxembourg 68 82.90 
Macao 67 79.29 
Macedonia 42 81.90 
Madagascar 1 100.00 
Malawi 13 91.45 
Malaysia 333 73.03 
Maldives 16 61.41 
Mali 8 62.36 
Malta 43 93.32 
Marshall Islands 16 89.20 
Mauritania 3 78.62 
Mauritius 161 78.22 
Mexico 537 70.97 
Moldova Republic 15 73.71 
Monaco 3 90.80 
Mongolia 15 62.40 
Montenegro 15 79.69 
Morocco 28 82.94 
Mozambique 26 85.79 
Myanmar 15 66.35 
Namibia 90 80.18 
Nepal 6 71.69 
Netherlands 492 86.52 
New Zealand 67 85.50 
Nicaragua 5 91.33 
Niger 1 49.00 
Nigeria 45 80.42 
Norway 44 86.41 
Oman 57 69.10 
Pakistan 39 65.11 
Palestinian Territories 6 80.47 
Panama 101 75.87 
Papua New Guinea 14 80.49 
Paraguay 5 71.54 
Peru 84 74.44 
Philippines 134 64.57 
Poland 477 77.42 
Portugal 26 91.97 
Qatar 62 64.91 
Romania 252 81.90 
Russia 918 76.22 
Rwanda 4 70.35 
Note: N is the number of firms. The host economies include 177 economies. “Ownership” refers to the average 
equity stake held by EMNEs in their subsidiaries.
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Table A1: Number of Firms and Key Variables by EMNEs’ Host Economies [Continued] 
Country N Ownership 
Samoa 14 94.93 
Saudi Arabia 114 58.83 
Senegal 4 92.90 
Serbia 110 79.54 
Seychelles 6 98.02 
Sierra Leone 3 88.91 
Singapore 580 80.94 
Slovakia 161 85.04 
Slovenia 66 63.33 
Solomon Islands 3 97.10 
South Africa 280 74.56 
South Korea 360 44.88 
Spain 115 88.43 
Sri Lanka 82 61.22 
Sudan 13 64.15 
Suriname 4 60.00 
Swaziland 24 90.30 
Sweden 68 80.91 
Switzerland 127 87.77 
Syria 18 72.93 
Taiwan 42 73.23 
Tajikistan 4 48.37 
Tanzania, United Republic 24 77.81 
Thailand 194 56.51 
Togo 1 75.00 
Tonga 1 100.00 
Trinidad and Tobago 4 95.71 
Tunisia 16 51.17 
Turkey 268 57.38 
Turkmenistan 5 45.48 
UAE 224 80.01 
Uganda 15 85.01 
UK 806 88.45 
Ukraine 196 74.03 
Uruguay 42 85.44 
US 1080 74.68 
Uzbekistan 15 76.72 
Vanuatu 3 97.33 
Venezuela 25 77.24 
Vietnam 127 63.95 
Yemen 1 10.00 
Zambia 32 92.20 
Zimbabwe 25 69.68 
Note: N is the number of firms. The host economies include 177 economies. “Ownership” refers to the average 
equity stake held by EMNEs in their subsidiaries. 
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Table A2: Additional Robustness Checks (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Cubic  
model 
Sub-period:  
2004-2007 
Sub-period:  
2008-2013 
Subsidiary 
ownership>0.25 
One lag  
model 
Two lags  
model 
Three lags 
model 
MULT 11.4887 -8.6289 10.1381** 11.2475***    
 (12.731) (6.791) (5.154) (4.216)    
MULT2 -10.4557 11.5049* -7.3791 -9.2940**    
 (26.611) (6.722) (4.926) (3.981)    
MULT3 2.0734       
 (16.590)       
MULT (one lag)     0.1000*   
     (0.053)   
MULT2 (one lag)     -0.0712   
     (0.052)   
MULT (two lags)      0.1581**  
      (0.066)  
MULT2 (two lags)      -0.1543**  
      (0.061)  
MULT (three lags)       0.0457 
       (0.055) 
MULT2 (three lags)       -0.0788* 
       (0.047) 
Controls X X X X X X X 
Adj R-squared 0.136 0.148 0.098 0.133 0.037 0.041 0.041 
No. observation 4227 846 3378 3863 3384 2593 1898 
F statistics 11.233 3.838 8.542 10.983 5.417 4.325 4.834 
Note: Return on assets is the dependent variable. Model 1 adds a cubic term to test the potential cubic relationship. Models 2-3 are used to test the MP relationship in different 
sub-periods. Model 4 uses 25.01% instead of 10.01% as subsidiary ownership threshold when defining a foreign subsidiary. Models 5-7 are different lag models, including from 
one-year lag to three-year lags models. All models control for firm and time fixed effects. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: *0.1; **0.05; 
***0.01. 
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Table A3: Additional Robustness Checks (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
OSD’ED -0.0768   
 (0.063)   
(OSD’ED)2 0.0015*   
 (0.001)   
OSD’ING 0.0206   
 (0.046)   
(OSD’ING)2 -0.0003   
 (0.000)   
OCD’ED  0.0764  
  (0.305)  
(OCD’ED)2  -0.0016  
  (0.017)  
OCD’ING  0.2344  
  (0.220)  
(OCD’ING)2  -0.0134*  
  (0.007)  
FSTSD’ED   4.2495 
   (3.784) 
(FSTSD’ED)2   -2.4986 
   (3.689) 
FSTSD’ING   -4.6390 
   (4.903) 
(FSTSD’ING)2   5.9820 
   (4.971) 
SIZE 2.2639*** 2.2449*** 4.1939*** 
 (0.795) (0.791) (1.311) 
LEV -6.3623*** -6.3997*** -6.7071*** 
 (0.691) (0.684) (1.146) 
PROD 2.3727*** 2.3451*** 4.5967*** 
 (0.855) (0.846) (1.184) 
AGE -1.6909 -1.3666 -0.2398 
 (1.418) (1.373) (1.846) 
ECON 0.3761 0.4168 1.0698 
 (1.227) (1.211) (1.414) 
GROW 0.2515*** 0.2549*** 0.1283 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.079) 
HOMI -3.2826 -3.1059 -2.6867 
 (2.056) (2.170) (3.813) 
HOSI 0.0958 0.2051 -0.1724 
 (0.335) (0.334) (0.497) 
Adj R-squared 0.136 0.134 0.166 
No. observation 4227 4227 1501 
F statistics 10.255 11.115 5.824 
 Note: Return on assets is the dependent variable. OS refers to the number of overseas subsidiaries, OC refers to 
the number of overseas countries. FSTS refers to the ratio of overseas majority-owned subsidiaries’ sales to all 
majority-owned subsidiaries’ sales. All models control for firm and time fixed effects. Values in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. Significance levels: *0.1; **0.05; ***0.01.  
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Table A4: Additional Robustness Checks (3)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
All MNEs All MNEs All MNEs All MNEs POEs POEs POEs POEs  
ROS ROE Net profit Gross profit High-tech 
sectors 
Low-tech 
sectors 
Manufacturing 
sectors 
Service 
sectors 
MULTD’ED 15.2558** 30.2640** 1.4546*** 0.5833** 0.3099 0.6552*** 0.5639** 0.4931 
 (6.239) (12.764) (0.511) (0.228) (0.341) (0.234) (0.236) (0.343) 
(MULTD’ED)2 -14.0463** -32.0736** -1.4829*** -0.5370** -0.1620 -0.6570*** -0.5208** -0.3689 
 (7.135) (13.889) (0.521) (0.240) (0.434) (0.236) (0.247) (0.399) 
MULTD’ING -5.6760 2.0535 -0.2426 -0.0941 -0.2259 -0.0037 -0.2816 0.1166 
 (6.903) (8.337) (0.475) (0.208) (0.331) (0.308) (0.246) (0.496) 
(MULTD’ING)2 4.6698 1.4523 0.0993 0.2111 0.3477 -0.0013 0.1561 0.1541 
 (8.355) (10.765) (0.545) (0.202) (0.343) (0.290) (0.263) (0.426) 
SIZE 1.0117 5.3273*** 0.7957*** 0.8745*** 0.8414*** 0.8559*** 0.8634*** 0.8727*** 
 (2.224) (1.847) (0.108) (0.042) (0.069) (0.056) (0.050) (0.066) 
LEV -8.6172*** -14.7209*** -0.5676*** -0.0559** -0.0721 -0.0665** -0.0710** -0.0367 
 (1.137) (2.253) (0.062) (0.024) (0.046) (0.028) (0.028) (0.043) 
PROD 1.5549 5.9880*** 0.7592*** 0.8897*** 0.8650*** 0.8850*** 0.8834*** 0.8953*** 
 (2.381) (2.089) (0.108) (0.042) (0.063) (0.058) (0.055) (0.060) 
AGE -2.9856 -0.7021 -0.3495* 0.0124 -0.2346 0.0718 -0.1997 0.0415 
 (2.714) (4.113) (0.195) (0.099) (0.196) (0.140) (0.134) (0.175) 
ECON 2.4653 2.0466 0.2538 0.0558 0.2051** 0.1615** 0.1306* 0.3598*** 
 (2.205) (3.383) (0.160) (0.066) (0.085) (0.081) (0.072) (0.124) 
GROW 0.3135*** 0.5494*** 0.0353*** -0.0004 0.0050 -0.0035 0.0011 -0.0067 
 (0.097) (0.152) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) 
HOMI 4.9487 -7.1859 0.4985* 0.0765 -0.1022 0.0219 0.1556 -0.2653 
 (3.134) (7.282) (0.258) (0.104) (0.204) (0.139) (0.150) (0.186) 
HOSI -1.0610 0.4676 -0.0632 0.0006 0.0114 -0.0092 -0.0240 0.0303  
(0.844) (0.947) (0.050) (0.023) (0.048) (0.032) (0.025) (0.052) 
Adj R-squared 0.081 0.095 0.219 0.624 0.694 0.559 0.641 0.589 
No. observation 4115 4227 2946 3517 892 2185 1730 1223 
F statistics 7.682 7.419 18.448 71.020 44.984 41.338 49.927 33.369 
Note: ROA is dependent variable in Model 5-8. Models 1-4 employ alternative performance measures, including ROS, ROE, net and gross profit. Models 5-8 conduct POE sectoral analysis 
(high- vs. low-tech; manufacturing vs. service). All models control for firm and time fixed effects. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: *0.1; **0.05; ***0.01. 
